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NOTE 
Vindicating the Effective Vindication Exception: 
Protecting Federal Statutory Rights in the Employment 
Context 
I. Introduction 
Arbitration is a form of alternate dispute resolution that allows parties to 
submit a dispute to an independent third party for resolution.
1
 Arbitration 
serves the purpose of resolving disputes between parties without involving 
the traditional judicial process.
2
 The terms and procedures for arbitration 
are dictated by an arbitration agreement, and barring a few exceptions,
3
 the 
decision to arbitrate is binding upon the parties.
4
 Under federal law, courts 
treat arbitration agreements as a matter of contract.
5
 The primary benefits of 
arbitration are the reduced cost and quicker resolution of disputes as 
compared to the traditional legal process.
6
 Critics of arbitration, however, 
point out that arbitration can easily become more expensive than the 
traditional legal process when one accounts for the costs associated with the 
arbitral forum, including arbitrator fees and administrative costs.
7
 
In recent decades, as the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
expressed a federal preference for the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, corporations have increasingly begun to insert arbitration 
clauses in form contracts with employees.
8
 This increase in mandatory 
arbitration in the employment context can create problems for employees 
when a dispute with their employer arises. Unlike arbitration agreements 
between sophisticated, repeat-player corporations in which both sides 
voluntarily accept the terms, arbitration agreements in the employment 
context often create inequities between parties as a result of boilerplate 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 6:1 (3d ed. 2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 4. GRENIG, supra note 1, § 12:20. 
 5. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 6. GRENIG, supra note 1, § 6:2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action 
Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 329, 336 (2015); Michele L. Giovagnoli, Comment, To Be or Not to Be?: Recent 
Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Arena, 64 UMKC L. 
REV. 547, 555 (1996). 
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language, ignorance of what arbitration entails, and unequal bargaining 
power.  
One particular concern with mandatory arbitration in the employment 
context involves the de facto waiver of federal statutory rights. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the compelled arbitration of claims 
that arise out of federal statutory rights.
9
 Now, some commentators have 
voiced concern that individuals will be increasingly forced to forego federal 
statutory claims because the filing fees and costs associated with arbitration 
make it economically unfeasible to pursue those claims.
10
 The combination 
of compelled arbitration and the often prohibitive costs associated with 
arbitration can lead to situations in which a prospective litigant is barred 
from vindicating his or her federal statutory rights in court, and is likewise 
unable to vindicate those rights in the arbitral forum because arbitration 
costs may far exceed his or her potential recovery.
11
 
One solution to this problem exists in the form of the “effective 
vindication” exception to the arbitration of federal statutory rights. The 
effective vindication doctrine invalidates arbitration agreements that thwart 
a party from “effectively . . . vindicat[ing] its statutory cause of action in 
the arbitral forum.”12 Although the effective vindication exception provides 
an avenue for courts to protect important federal statutory rights, recent 
developments in the doctrine have created an open question as to the true 
breadth of the exception.
13
  
In the most recent Supreme Court analysis of the effective vindication 
exception, the Court construed the exception narrowly, suggesting that it 
applies only to arbitration agreements that “constitute the elimination of the 
right to pursue” a federal statutory right.14 This narrow conception of the 
effective vindication exception appears to limit its application to arbitration 
agreements that expressly forbid the assertion of a federal statutory right or 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); 
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91–92 (2000); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985). 
 10. Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 133 (2004). 
 11. Id. at 133–34. 
 12. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637. 
 13. Compare Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (2013) (focusing effective vindication 
exception analysis on the party’s “right to pursue” federal statutory claims), with Nesbitt v. 
FCNH, Inc., 811 F.3d 371, 377 (2016) (focusing effective vindication exception on whether 
arbitration agreement provides party with an “effective and accessible” forum). 
 14. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311. 
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to those that result in “filing and administrative fees . . . that are so high as 
to make access to [arbitration] impracticable.”15 
Based on its decision in Shankle v. B-G Maintenance,
16
 and more 
recently in Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc.,
17
 the Tenth Circuit charted a separate 
path regarding the application of the effective vindication exception. The 
Tenth Circuit applies the effective vindication exception to arbitration 
agreements that forbid the assertion of federal statutory rights and to 
agreements that do not provide an “effective and accessible alternative 
forum.”18 By considering the totality of the effects the arbitration has on a 
litigant’s ability to vindicate his or her federal statutory rights, the Tenth 
Circuit’s approach to the effective vindication exception offers a better 
balance between the federal preference for enforcing arbitration and the 
needs of prospective litigants who face a significant disadvantage in terms 
of sophistication, bargaining power, and financial resources.  
This Note explores the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the effective 
vindication exception. Part II traces the development of the law regarding 
the general enforceability of arbitration agreements and the effective 
vindication exception prior to Nesbitt. Part III examines the factual and 
procedural background of Nesbitt and the Tenth Circuit’s rational for 
invalidating the arbitration agreement involved. Part IV explores the 
potential benefits and consequences of Nesbitt, both for individuals seeking 
to invalidate arbitration agreements and for businesses seeking to enforce 
those agreements, as well as for the future of arbitration as a whole. Finally, 
Part V explains why courts should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach in 
Nesbitt so as to better effectuate the effective vindication exception and the 
ultimate purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act.  
II. Law Before the Case 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act and Initial Non-Arbitrability of Federal 
Statutory Rights 
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to “reverse 
the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place 
arbitration upon the same footing as other contracts.”19 In pertinent part, the 
FAA provides that: 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Id. at 2310–11. 
 16. 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 17. 811 F.3d at 380–81.  
 18. Id. at 377 (emphasis added). 
 19. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.
20
 
Other portions of the FAA allow for a judicial stay when a dispute may be 
subject to arbitration and, when necessary, an order compelling a party to 
comply with its agreement to arbitrate a dispute.
21
 Together these 
provisions demonstrate a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements.”22 Because of this federal preference for arbitration, courts 
have come to “‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to 
their terms.”23 
While it is now well-established that this federal preference for 
arbitration includes agreements to arbitrate federal statutory claims, this 
was not always the case. For the first sixty years of the FAA’s existence, 
the Supreme Court did not permit the arbitration of federal statutory 
claims.
24
 The Court first voiced its opposition to the arbitration of federal 
statutory rights in Wilko v. Swan.
25
 Wilko involved an arbitration agreement 
that covered federal statutory rights guaranteed by the Securities Act of 
1933.
26
 The Securities Act of 1933 includes a provision which renders void 
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any 
security to waive compliance with any provision of [the Act].”27 The Court 
invalidated the agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities 
Act of 1933, noting that “the intention of Congress concerning the sale of 
securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for 
arbitration of issues arising under the Act.”28  
Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Wilko provides insight to the Court’s 
current position on the arbitrability of federal statutory rights. Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 21. Id. §§ 3, 4. 
 22. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
 23. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). 
 24. Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication 
Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 394 (2014). 
 25. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). 
 26. Id. at 428–29. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012). 
 28. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. 
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Frankfurter disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that arbitration would 
be inappropriate for issues arising under the Securities Act.
29
 He pointed 
out that “[a]rbitrators may not disregard the law” and their doing so would 
“constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act.”30 In his opinion, the advantages of allowing 
claims arising under the Securities Act to be resolved by arbitration 
outweighed the Court’s concern that an arbitrator’s decision would be 
inferior to the judicial forum and would jeopardize a plaintiff’s federal 
statutory rights.
31
 
B. The Development of the Effective Vindication Exception 
As arbitration increased in popularity, the Court was forced to rethink its 
position on the arbitrability of federal statutory claims. The rule forbidding 
the arbitration of federal statutory claims conflicted with the Court’s 
developing preference for arbitration.
32
 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court finally addressed this conflict head-on.
33
 
Mitsubishi involved a dispute between two international companies, a 
Japanese car manufacturer (Mitsubishi) and a Puerto Rican distributor 
(Soler Chrysler-Plymouth).
34
 The two companies entered into a Distributor 
Agreement and Sales Agreement whereby Soler Chrysler-Plymouth would 
sell cars produced by Mitsubishi.
35
 The Sales Agreement included an 
arbitration clause which provided that “[a]ll disputes, controversies, or 
differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] . . . shall be 
finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and 
regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.”36  
After multiple disagreements arose between Mitsubishi and Soler 
regarding poor sales performance and Mitsubishi’s resulting refusal to 
divert certain shipments, Mitsubishi brought an action in the United States 
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking enforcement of the 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445, rev’d Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 
427). 
 31. Id. at 439–40. 
 32. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 
(1983); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union, 430 
U.S. 243, 255 (1977); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960). 
 33. 473 U.S. 614, 616 (1985). 
 34. Id. at 616–17. 
 35. Id. at 617. 
 36. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
766 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:761 
 
 
arbitration agreement under the FAA.
37
 Soler counterclaimed, alleging, 
among other things, a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
38
  
In reversing the Court’s previous course, the Mitsubishi Court rejected 
the Wilko non-arbitrability doctrine in favor of the liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration.
39
 Dismissing concerns about the protection of 
important statutory rights, the Court explained that “[in] agreeing to 
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, 
rather than a judicial, forum.”40 Thus, the Court extended the strong 
presumption in favor of arbitration to arbitration agreements concerning 
federal statutory rights.
41
 
Even as it expanded the breadth of the FAA, the Court rejected the 
notion that its holding in Mitsubishi implied that “all controversies 
implicating statutory rights are suitable for arbitration.”42 Rather, the Court 
laid out the framework for the effective vindication exception, stating that 
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory 
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both 
its remedial and deterrent function.”43 But if the provisions of an arbitration 
agreement would operate to waive a litigant’s right to pursue a statutory 
remedy, the Court “would have little hesitation in condemning the 
agreement as against public policy.”44 So while the Court determined that 
the FAA permitted the arbitration of federal statutory claims, it also 
reserved the right to invalidate any arbitration agreement that threatens to 
undermine the vindication of federal statutory rights.
45
 
Subsequent to Mitsubishi, the Court has recognized the effective 
vindication exception but has never applied it to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement.
46
 The Supreme Court’s apparent hesitation in invoking the 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 618 (alterations in original). 
 38. Id. at 619-20. 
 39. Id. at 639–40. 
 40. Id. at 628. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 627. 
 43. Id. at 637 (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. at 637 n.19. 
 45. See Robert Ward, Note, Divide & Conquer: How the Supreme Court Used the 
Federal Arbitration Act to Threaten Statutory Rights and the Need to Codify the Effective 
Vindication Rule, 39 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149, 155–56 (2015). 
 46. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273–74 (2009); Green Tree 
Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91–92 (2000); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991). 
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effective vindication exception therefore suggests that a party claiming the 
exception likely faces a heavy burden in proving its applicability.
47
 
However, the Tenth Circuit’s application of the effective vindication 
exception in Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 
provided a more forgiving burden for a party seeking to invalidate an 
arbitration agreement.
48
 In Shankle, the Tenth Circuit invalidated an 
arbitration agreement between an employee and his employer that required 
the employee to pay one-half of the arbitrator’s fees.49 The arbitration 
agreement’s failure to provide an “accessible forum” for the employee to 
assert his Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claims “clearly 
undermine[d] the remedial and deterrent functions of the federal anti-
discrimination laws.”50 The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the effective 
vindication rule clearly set a lower bar for application of the exception than 
the Supreme Court evinced in its earlier decisions.
51
 
The most detailed analysis of the effective vindication exception 
performed by the Supreme Court since Mitsubishi occurred in Green Tree 
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.
52
 Green Tree involved an 
arbitration agreement between Green Tree (a lender) and Randolph (a 
borrower).
53
 When Randolph brought a claim against Green Tree under the 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Green Tree filed a motion to compel 
arbitration.
54
 Randolph asked the district court to invalidate the arbitration 
agreement because her lack of financial resources coupled with the steep 
costs of arbitration would force her to “forgo her [federal statutory] claims 
against [Green Tree].”55  
While the Court declined to apply the effective vindication exception to 
Randolph’s TILA claims, it provided some insight into what type of 
circumstances would trigger the exception. The Court mused that while 
“the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from 
effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum,”56 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Olga Bykov, Note, Vindication of Federal Statutory Rights: The Future of Cost-
Based Challenges to Arbitration Clauses After American Express v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant and Green Tree v. Randolph, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1323, 1341 (2017). 
 48. 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 49. Id. at 1234-35. 
 50. Id. at 1235. 
 51. See cases cited supra note 13. 
 52. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 53. Id. at 82. 
 54. Id. at 83. 
 55. Id. at 83–84. 
 56. Id. at 90. 
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the mere “risk” that a litigant may face prohibitive costs was not enough to 
trigger the exception.
57
 Instead, a party seeking to invoke the effective 
vindication exception must show a “likelihood” that he or she will actually 
incur prohibitive costs.
58
 The Court did not elaborate, however, on the level 
of detail a party must provide before the party seeking to compel arbitration 
must supply evidence to the contrary.
59
 
After Green Tree, the contours of effective vindication rule became 
clearer: an agreement to arbitrate a federal statutory claim would be 
enforced unless the challenging party could demonstrate that the arbitration 
agreement would prohibit the party from effectively vindicating those 
rights.
60
 Circumstances that would trigger the effective vindication 
exception included, at a minimum, agreements that expressly waived 
federal statutory rights or imposed prohibitively large arbitration costs.
61
 
Moreover, the party challenging the enforceability of the agreement bears 
the burden of demonstrating the existence of those circumstances.
62
  
C. Limitations on the Effective Vindication Exception 
Prior to American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,
63
 the Court’s 
effective vindication exception existed as set forth in Mitsubishi and Green 
Tree. In Italian Colors, rather than more clearly defining the exception, the 
Court instead chose to curtail its applicability.  
In the case, a group of merchants commenced a class action against 
American Express for violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
section 4 of the Clayton Act.
64
 The agreement between American Express 
and the merchants required that all disputes arising out of the contractual 
relationship be submitted to arbitration.
65
 Additionally, each merchant was 
required to arbitrate individually, as the agreement expressly prohibited 
class arbitration.
66
 While the district court granted American Express’s 
motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the class action, the Second 
Circuit reversed the decision, due in part to the prohibitive costs the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 91. 
 58. Id. at 92. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Chukwumerije, supra note 24, at 400. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90–92; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985). 
 63. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 64. Id. at 2308. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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merchants would incur if “compelled to arbitrate under the class action 
waiver.”67  
On appeal to the Supreme Court, after determining that the parties 
voluntarily submitted to arbitration and that no “contrary congressional 
command” compelled the Court to invalidate the arbitration agreement, the 
Court turned to consideration of the effective vindication rule.
68
 The Court 
began by noting that the effective vindication exception “originated as 
dictum in Mitsubishi Motors” out of concern for arbitration agreements that 
eliminate a party’s “right to pursue” federal statutory claims.69 By reducing 
the exception to mere dictum, the Court created ample space to redefine the 
scope of the rule.  
Focusing in particular on the right to pursue statutory remedies instead of 
the ability to effectively vindicate those remedies, the Court narrowed the 
exception to cover only arbitration agreements that actually prohibit a party 
from accessing the arbitral forum. Thus, the exception “would certainly 
cover a provision . . . forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights” 
and “would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to 
arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”70 
This new iteration of the effective vindication exception seemingly 
eliminates collateral costs not specific to the arbitral forum, such as the 
costs of attorney’s fees, expert witnesses, and production of evidence.71 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion made clear “the fact that it is not worth the 
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the 
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”72 
In a strong dissent, Justice Kagan objected to Justice Scalia’s 
characterization of the effective vindication exception as mere dicta and to 
his application of the exception to the facts presented in Italian Colors.
73
 
Justice Kagan pointed out that by refusing to apply the effective vindication 
exception to the agreement between American Express and the merchants, 
the Court effectively allowed American Express to insulate itself from 
private enforcement of both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, because 
the cost of proving an antitrust violation (between several hundred thousand 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. (quoting In re Am. Express Merchant’s Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 315-16 (2d Cir. 
2009)). 
 68. Id. at 2309. 
 69. Id. at 2310. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. See Bykov, supra note 47, at 1349, 1353. 
 72. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311. 
 73. Id. at 2317–18, 2317 n.3 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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and one million dollars) far exceeds the potential recovery for individual 
merchants ($38,549 in Italian Colors Restaurant’s case).74 Justice Kagan 
asserted that this was precisely the type of prohibitive cost the exception 
was meant to safeguard against, because “[n]o rational actor would bring a 
claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring costs in 
the hundreds of thousands.”75  
The Court’s newest limitation of the effective vindication exception in 
Italian Colors led many commentators to wonder what remains of the 
rule.
76
 Moreover, Italian Colors seemed to directly conflict with the Tenth 
Circuit’s application of the effective vindication rule set forth in Shankle. 
Just two years later, the Tenth Circuit was presented an opportunity to 
reconsider the effective vindication exception in light of the developments 
at the Supreme Court level. 
III. Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc. 
A. Facts 
Rhonda Nesbitt brought an action against FCNH, Inc. and five other 
defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado 
on April 7, 2014, for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and 
state labor laws.
77
 FCNH and the other defendants owned and operated 
thirty-one for-profit schools that offered education in massage therapy, skin 
care, and esthetics.
78
 These schools required students to provide services to 
the public but did not compensate the students for providing such 
services.
79
 
Nesbitt enrolled in one of the defendants’ schools, the Denver School of 
Massage Therapy, and was required to provide uncompensated services to 
the public as a part of her curriculum.
80
 When Nesbitt enrolled, she signed 
an enrollment contract that included an arbitration clause.
81
 This clause 
required arbitration of any dispute arising out her enrollment at the school, 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 2316. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Bykov, supra note 47, at 1336; Chukwumerije, supra note 24, at 449. 
 77. Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 811 F.3d 371, 375 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 78. Id. at 373. 
 79. Id. at 374. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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the educational services provided to her by the school, or any other related 
matter.
82
 The agreement also stated the following: 
Arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the 
Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association 
applying federal law to the fullest extent possible, and the 
substantive and procedural provisions of the Federal Arbitration 
Act shall govern this Arbitration Agreement and any and all 
issues relating to the enforcement of Arbitration Agreement and 
the arbitrability of the claims between the parties.
83
 
Finally, the arbitration agreement provided that “[e]ach party shall bear 
the expense of its own counsel, experts, witnesses, and preparation and 
presentation of the proofs,” and allowed students to opt out of the 
arbitration agreement by mailing in a signed rejection notice.
84
 Nesbitt 
failed to comply with the opt-out procedures required by the arbitration 
agreement.
85
 
B. District Court Proceedings 
After Nesbitt brought suit, FCNH and the other defendants filed a motion 
to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration 
agreement.
86
 Although the district court agreed with the defendants that the 
arbitration agreement “[wa]s not procedurally unconscionable” because 
Nesbitt was provided with ample opportunity to review the contract and opt 
out of the arbitration agreement, it denied the defendants’ motion on other 
grounds.
87
 The court turned to the effective vindication exception, finding 
that two provisions of the arbitration agreement served to “prevent Ms. 
Nesbitt . . . from effectively vindicating [her] statutory rights under the 
FLSA,”88 including (1) a section requiring that arbitration be conducted 
according to the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association, and (2) a section requiring each party to bear its own expenses 
in proving its case in arbitration.
89
 The district court agreed with Nesbitt’s 
contention that together these two provisions imposed a prohibitively high 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (citation omitted). 
 84. Id. at 374–75. 
 85. Id. at 378. 
 86. Id. at 375. 
 87. Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1372 (D. Colo. 2014). 
 88. Id. at 1373. 
 89. Id. 
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cost on Nesbitt’s ability to vindicate her claim in the arbitral forum, thereby 
making the agreement unenforceable under the effective vindication 
exception.
90
 In agreeing with Nesbitt’s effective vindication argument, the 
district court relied on Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of 
Colorado, Inc., which held an arbitration agreement unenforceable because 
it placed the employee-plaintiff “between the proverbial rock and a hard 
place—it prohibited use of the judicial forum, where a litigant is not 
required to pay for a judge’s services, and the prohibitive cost [of 
arbitration] substantially limited use of the arbitral forum.”91  
The district court understood Shankle as standing for the proposition that 
“an arbitration agreement requiring a plaintiff to share in the costs of 
arbitration is unenforceable when the agreement effectively deprives the 
plaintiff of an accessible forum to resolve his statutory claims and vindicate 
his statutory rights.”92 The district court’s interpretation of Shankle and 
application of the effective vindication exception greatly differs from the 
Supreme Court’s approach in Italian Colors. Rather than focusing on a 
party’s technical right or ability to vindicate a federal statutory claim in the 
arbitral forum (as Italian Colors instructed), the district court focused 
instead on the accessibility of the arbitral forum.
93
 While this approach 
undoubtedly provides more protection to individuals who have signed 
arbitration agreements, it runs counter to the “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration” and the Court’s narrow application of the effective vindication 
exception.
94
 Nevertheless, finding no savings clause in the arbitration 
agreement, the district court invalidated the entire arbitration agreement as 
unenforceable.
95
 
C. Tenth Circuit Decision 
On appeal, the issue before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was 
whether the district court properly applied the effective vindication 
exception.
96
 This forced the Tenth Circuit to address the incongruity 
between its conception of the effective vindication exception in Shankle and 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. 
 91. 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (1999). 
 92. Nesbitt, 74 F. Supp. at 1373 (quoting Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., 
No. 10-CV-02272-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 2791338, at *10 (D. Colo. July 15, 2011)). 
 93. See cases cited supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 94. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 
(1985); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013).  
 95. Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 811 F.3d 371, 376 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 96. Id.  
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the Supreme Court’s most recent application of the exception in Italian 
Colors.
97
 
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by reiterating the general effective 
vindication exception rule: agreements to arbitrate are invalid when they 
“operate as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory 
remedies.”98 While the Tenth Circuit made mention of language the 
Supreme Court used in Italian Colors—language indicating that the 
effective vindication exception “would certainly cover a provision . . . 
forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights” and possibly “filing and 
administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access 
to the forum impracticable”99—the Tenth Circuit did not follow such a 
narrow interpretation of the effective vindication exception. 
Instead, the Tenth Circuit, like the district court below, relied on Shankle 
and focused not only on the right to access the arbitral forum, but also on 
the practical ability to access the forum.
100
 The court’s effective vindication 
rule set forth in Nesbitt invalidates any arbitration agreement when factors 
specific to the arbitral forum act to “prevent an individual from effectively 
vindicating his or her statutory rights.”101 Having determined that the 
effective vindication exception applies when an arbitration agreement 
denies a litigant an “effective and accessible alternative forum,” the court 
then considered whether Nesbitt met her burden under Green Tree to show 
that the arbitration agreement imposed prohibitive costs that would trigger 
the effective vindication exception.
102
  
The defendants first argued that Nesbitt was precluded from asserting the 
effective vindication doctrine because she failed to utilize the opt-out 
provision that would have “eliminated any dispute regarding the cost of 
arbitration.”103 The Tenth Circuit flatly rejected this argument because 
Nesbitt’s failure to opt out indicated that she voluntarily entered into the 
arbitration agreement and had no bearing on whether that agreement 
imposed costs that would trigger the exception.
104
 Next, the court rejected 
the defendants’ contention that Nesbitt’s failure to “pursue the possibility of 
deferred or reduced [arbitration] fees” meant that she failed to meet her 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See generally id. 
 98. Id. at 377. 
 99. Id. (quoting Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 378. 
 104. Id. 
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burden.
105
 The court noted that because Nesbitt would “be[] at the mercy” 
of the arbitrator as to whether she would be forced to shoulder prohibitive 
arbitration costs, relying on deferred or reduced fees did not facilitate the 
effective vindication of her rights under the FLSA.
106
 Finally, the 
defendants argued that Nesbitt failed to meet her burden under the effective 
vindication exception because she did not provide “evidence regarding the 
cost of prosecuting her class or collective action claims.”107 The court flatly 
rejected this argument because the defendants failed to raise the argument 
below.
108
 
Because the Tenth Circuit concluded that the effective vindication 
exception could apply to prohibitively expensive arbitration agreements and 
that Nesbitt met the burden required by Green Tree, it affirmed the district 
court’s decision to invalidate the arbitration agreement. In doing so, the 
Tenth Circuit reaffirmed Shankle and its broader application of the effective 
vindication doctrine. Adoption of the Tenth Circuit’s approach by other 
courts would present the best opportunity for courts to both remain true to 
the federal preference for arbitration and protect the federal statutory rights 
of relatively powerless individuals.  
IV. Analysis 
The Tenth Circuit’s conception of the effective vindication exception 
strikes the ideal balance between the protection of consumers’ and 
employees’ federal statutory rights and the enforcement of valid arbitration 
agreements while also remaining consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Green Tree and Italian Colors. While Italian Colors forecloses 
the use of class action waivers as a justification for the invalidation of 
otherwise valid arbitration agreements under the effective vindication 
exception,
109
 the doctrine remains alive and well with respect to costs 
directly associated with the arbitral forum.
110
 Lower courts have recognized 
this distinction post-Italian Colors and have found that the effective 
vindication exception can be used to invalidate arbitration agreements when 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 379. 
 108. Id. (citing Martinez v. Angel Expl., LLC, 798 F.3d 968, 974 (10th Cir. 2015)). 
 109. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
 110. Bykov, supra note 47, at 1348–49. 
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arbitration-specific costs prevent a plaintiff from vindicating its federal 
statutory claims.
111
  
In the absence of any legislation codifying the effective vindication 
exception in the FAA,
112
 courts should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach 
to the effective vindication exception for two reasons. First, applying the 
effective vindication exception to arbitration-specific costs that inhibit the 
practical ability to access the arbitral forum offers more protection for 
employees and consumers who possess little bargaining power. And 
second, companies seeking to impose mandatory arbitration on employees 
or consumers can still craft mandatory arbitration agreements that may help 
to reduce litigation while still allowing the vindication of federal statutory 
rights.  
Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision to abandon the non-
arbitrability doctrine in the 1980s and 1990s, corporations have greatly 
expanded their use of mandatory arbitration clauses to compel the 
arbitration of federal statutory rights.
113
 These arbitration clauses are 
inserted into contracts that employees or consumers must sign as a 
condition precedent to obtaining employment or obtaining a good or 
service.
114
 Mandatory arbitration has become so popular among large 
companies that one recent study found that around ninety-three percent of 
leading telecommunications, credit, and financial firms employ arbitration 
clauses in their contracts with employees.
115
 The proliferation of 
mandatory, binding arbitration agreements often forces consumers and 
employees to choose between accepting mandatory arbitration or foregoing 
employment opportunities or the ability to purchase goods and services.
116
 
Although mandatory arbitration may benefit some consumers by limiting 
costs—perhaps ultimately reducing the price of goods and services—it also 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See, e.g., Nesbitt, 811 F.3d at 376; Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 
927 (9th Cir. 2013); Byrd v. SunTrust Bank, No. 2:12-cv-02314-JPM-cgc, 2013 WL 
3816714, at *18–19 (W.D. Tenn. July 22, 2013). 
 112. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 113. Ashley M. Sergeant, Student Article, The Corporation’s New Lethal Weapon: 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses, 57 S.D. L. REV. 149, 149 (2012). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of 
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
871, 886 (2008). 
 116. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking 
the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/ 
business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html. 
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threatens the ability of consumers and employees to pursue claims and 
undermines federal statutory rights.  
The effective vindication exception can provide a solution to both 
problems if accorded the appropriate breadth. Rather than focusing the 
effective vindication exception on the technical ability to access the arbitral 
forum, as the Supreme Court did in Italian Colors,
117
 courts should instead 
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding an arbitration 
agreement like the Tenth Circuit did in Nesbitt.
118
 When an arbitration 
agreement expressly forbids the assertion of a federal statutory right, or 
imposes arbitration-specific expenses
119
 that make access to the arbitral 
forum impracticable, courts should invalidate the agreement under the 
effective vindication exception if the party opposing arbitration meets its 
burden of showing it will actually incur those expenses.
120
 But if the only 
impediment facing the party opposing arbitration is the possibility that the 
cost of proving its claim in arbitration might outweigh potential recovery on 
that claim, such agreement must be upheld under the Court’s decisions in 
Green Tree and Italian Colors.
121
  
The Court’s decision to allow the compelled arbitration of federal 
statutory rights in Mitsubishi was predicated on the ability to “effectively [] 
vindicate its statutory cause of action.”122 Additionally, as the United States 
pointed out in its amicus brief in Italian Colors, “[p]rivate actions are a 
vital supplement to government enforcement not only under the antitrust 
laws, but also under a wide range of other federal statutes.”123 The Tenth 
Circuit’s approach to the effective vindication exception in Nesbitt should 
be adopted in order to ensure not only that prospective litigants may 
effectively vindicate their rights, but also to ensure that private enforcement 
of federal statutory rights remains a vital supplement to enforcement by the 
government. 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013). 
 118. Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 811 F.3d 371, 377 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 119. Arbitration specific costs include, inter alia, arbitration filing fees, arbitrators’ 
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Additionally, broadening the application of the effective vindication 
exception need not lead to a marked increase in the invalidation of 
mandatory arbitration agreements. Companies could simply alter their 
contracts to include “consumer-friendly” arbitration clauses that will 
withstand cost-based challenges to compelled arbitration.
124
 In the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, where 
the Court praised AT&T’s consumer-friendly arbitration agreement,125 
corporations were advised to adopt similar consumer-friendly provisions in 
their own agreements to avoid judicial invalidation.
126
 One commentator 
examined thirty-seven arbitration clauses post-Concepcion, noting that 
nearly all the clauses had been amended, many to add pro-consumer 
provisions.
127
 By adding consumer-friendly provisions to arbitration 
agreements, potential defendants can ensure they will reap the benefits of 
compelled arbitration of federal statutory rights without inhibiting the 
ability of potential plaintiffs to vindicate those same rights. 
V. Conclusion 
As recent cases involving mandatory arbitration have demonstrated, the 
Supreme Court maintains a very narrow view of the effective vindication 
exception’s applicability. The Court’s detached focus on the right to 
vindicate statutory claims disregards the practical realities that face many 
employees and consumers subject to arbitration agreements. Such 
individuals often cannot afford the filing fees and other costs associated 
with arbitration, precluding the vindication of their federal statutory claims. 
The Tenth Circuit’s approach to the effective vindication exception focuses 
instead on the practical effects of an arbitration agreement by requiring an 
accessible arbitral forum.  
Arbitration represents an effective tool to expedite the resolution of 
disputes and relieve an increasingly overcrowded court docket. Yet these 
benefits do not justify the erosion of federal statutory rights that has 
occurred over the past three decades. Individuals who sign arbitration 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See Myriam Gilles, Killing Them With Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” 
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 844 
(2012). 
 125. 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011). 
 126. Gilles, supra note 124, at 844–45 (“Much of this advice explicitly urges prospective 
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agreements often do so because they have little choice, largely due to the 
differences in bargaining power and sophistication between large 
corporations and individual employees or consumers. To rectify this 
disparity, the Supreme Court should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach to 
the effective vindication rule and acknowledge that a more flexible totality 
of the circumstances approach will better serve the needs of individuals 
without undermining the text or purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act. 
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